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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAbstract 
Using the well-known dynamic fiscal policy framework pioneered by Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff, we examine the efficiency and welfare implications of  shifting from a linear 
marginal tax rate structure to a discrete rate structure characterized by two regions of flat 
tax rates of  15 and 28 percent. For a wide range of parameter values, we find that there is 
no sequence of lump-sum transfers that the (model) government can feasibly implement to 
make the shift from the linear to the discrete structure Pareto-improving. We conclude 
that the worldwide trend toward replacing rate structures having many small steps 
between tax rates with structures characterized by just a few large jumps is not easily 
accounted for by efficiency arguments. In the process of our analysis, we introduce a 
simple algorithm for solving dynamic fiscal policy models that include "kinks" in individual 
budget surfaces due to discrete tax codes.  In addition to providing a relatively 
straightforward way of extending Auerbach-Kotlikoff-type models to this class of 
problems, our approach has the side benefit of facilitating the interpretation of our results. 
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The 1980s was the decade of tax reform.  The American economy alone 
experienced two major changes in federal personal income-tax legislation, the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 198  1 (ERTA) and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86).  But 
significant change was not limited to the United States.  By 1989, tax legislation had been 
passed in Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Japan, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, with proposals for reform pending in many other nations (see Tanzi [1987], 
Boskin and McLure [1990], and Whalley [1990b]). 
Although actual and proposed tax legislation within each of these countries was 
multifaceted, sometimes with substantial variance in details, reform proposals shared 
certain broad characteristics across countries. Most striking among these was the uniform 
tendency toward lower top marginal tax rates, fewer rate brackets, and "base broadening." 
For example, in the latest rounds of reform, top statutory marginal rates in the federal 
personal tax codes fell from 34 to 29 percent in Canada, 83 to 40 percent in the United 
Kingdom, and 50 to 3 1 percent in the United States.l Corresponding to these changes 
were reductions in the number of rate brackets from 10 to 3 (Canada), 11  to 2 (U.K.), and 
12 to 3 (U.S.).  These examples and others are summarized in table 1. 
The motivation for these changes was clearly the growing perception that the 
distortionary effects of high marginal tax rates had resulted in substantial inefficiencies. 
Consequently, an essential impulse for tax reform was, and is, the desire to create more- 
efficient income tax systems by substituting base-broadening measures for high marginal 
tax rates.  Reductions in the number of rate brackets are presumably meant to reinforce 
this goal by simplifying the tax code and minimizing distortions through the creation of 
Effective marginal tax rates can differ from statutory rates due to special treatment of credits, 
deductions, and exemptions at certain threshold income levels.  An obvious example is the TRA86 
provision for phasing out personal exemptions for high-income taxpayers. 
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implicit, this motivation for reducing the number of rate brackets is sometimes explicit in 
discussions of  specific tax reform proposals. For example, in discussing the Takeshita 
reforms in Japan, Noguchi (1990, page 118) describes the U.K. and U.S.  changes in rate 
structures as "developments ... toward flat-rate income taxes,"  while Ishi (1989) refers to 
the rate structure implemented in Japan as a "modified flat-tax" system. 
However, a brief glance at figures 1A-IC, which depict various vintages of 
Canadian, Japanese, and U.S. personal income-tax rate structures, suggests the 
problematic nature of concluding that a smaller number of rate brackets is less 
distortionary than a larger number.  Although it is true that recent rate structures have 
wider bands of income over which the marginal tax rate is flat, it is also true that jumps in 
the marginal rate are much more significant for some taxpayers.  It is unclear, a priori, 
which structure will, on net, most significantly distort household consumption and work- 
effort decisions.  Given the almost universal tendency toward reforms of this nature, it is 
surprising that these issues have not been given more attention. 
That, then, is the goal of this paper.  Using the well-known dynamic fiscal-policy 
framework pioneered by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, henceforth AK), we examine the 
welfare and efficiency implications of shifting from linear to discrete marginal tax-rate 
structures. In other words, we consider the pure distortionary effects of replacing a tax 
structure with many (infinitely small) steps between marginal tax rates with one defined by 
two large bands of flat tax rates connected by a single, large, discrete jump. 
We find that our hypothetical two-bracket code, which is  roughly patterned after 
the rate structure in the 1989 U.S. personal income tax code, is less efficient than 
alternative linear tax codes with similar average-tax progressivity and present-value 
revenue implications.  Specifically, following the general procedures outlined in AK, we 
find that there is no sequence of lump-sum transfers the government could feasibly 
implement that would make the shift from the linear to the discrete rate structure Pareto- 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmimproving. This finding is generally robust to parameter assumptions, to the chosen 
method for equalizing revenues, and to the degree to which the change is anticipated or 
unanticipated. 
In the process of our analysis, we introduce a simple algorithm for solving AK 
models with discrete tax codes.  The key to our strategy lies in noting that there exists a 
continuous tax code that replicates the necessary conditions for utility maximization of an 
individual facing the hypothesized discrete tax structure. Because we consider only 
compensated income tax systems, this equivalence, along with our standard preference 
assumptions, implies that the two rate structures will yield the same individual 
consumption and leisure plans. 
In addition to providing a relatively straightforward method of solving the discrete 
tax problem, our approach has the side benefit of facilitating the interpretation of our 
results.  When individuals facing a discrete jump in the marginal tax rate choose to be at 
the "kink"  in their budget surfaces, they act as if they are in a marginal tax bracket that is 
higher than the actual statutory bracket.  The government, however, collects revenue only 
at the lower statutory rate.  This discrepancy reduces the efficiency of  the discrete rate 
structure. In the pure life-cycle framework that we consider, the inefficiencies associated 
with this sort of bunching weigh most heavily during relatively productive periods of a 
taxpayer's life.  Hence, for the cases we examine, these inefficiencies typically outweigh 
the gains of flattening the rate structure over most income ranges. 
2.  The Simulation Model 
A.  Households and Preferences 
Our model economy is populated by a sequence of distinct cohorts that are, with 
the exception of size, identical in every respect.  Each generation lives, with perfect 
certainty, for 55 periods (interpreted as adult years) and is 1  +n times larger than its 
predecessor. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmIndividuals "born" at calendar date b choose perfect-foresight consumption (c) and 
leisure (I)  paths to maximize a time-separable utility function of the form 
55 
ub  =  Pt-lu(ct,b+t-l'  't.L+t-1)  7  (I) 
where q  > 0,~. < 0,  lirn i+..  ui =  0, lim i,,  y =  00, and ui is the partial derivative of the 
function u(-)  with respect to argument i.  The preference parameter P is the individual's 
subjective time-discount factor. We assume that P>O, but do not strictly require P<1. 
Letting a,,  equal the sum of  capital and government debt holdings for age t 
individuals at time s = b+t- 1, maximization of equation (1) is subject to a sequence of 
budget constraints given, at each time s, by 
where w,  is the real pre-tax market wage at time s, r,  is the real return to assets held from 
time s-1 to s,2 ct is an exogenous labor-efficiency endowment in the tth period of life, and 
v,!,  (zt,,) refers to lump-sum transfers (taxes) received (paid) by age t individuals at time s. 
The function T(y;,)defines  the amount of income tax paid, which depends on the 
tax base given by y:,  =  rsat-l,s-l  +  ctw,(l -  lt,s)  -  d. The constant d represents a fixed level 
of deductions and exemptions used to convert gross income to taxable income.  In the 
linear tax case, the function T (.) is defined as 
where 20)  defines the marginal tax rate as a linear function of taxable income. In the 
discrete tax case, the function is defined as 
Capital and govemment debt are assumed to be perfect substitutes in households' portfolios. 
5 
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constraint in the discrete tax case, corresponding to the cases where y,:,  < 8, y;, > 8,  and 
y;  = 7.  The latter applies when individuals are at the kink in the budget constraint. 
In addition to equation (2), we impose the initial condition that all individuals are 
born with zero wealth, and the terminal condition that the present value of lifetime 
resources cannot exceed the present value of lifetime consumption plus tax payments.  In 
the absence of a bequest motive and lifetime uncertainty, this wealth constraint implies that 
a55.s  = 0' 
B. The Government 
The government in our model raises revenues through a combination of 
distortionary income taxes, debt issues, and lump-sum taxes. Government purchases of 
output equal zero at all times, and all government revenues are eventually redistributed to 
households in the form of  lump-sum transfers. We specifically require that revenues 
raised from the income tax be rebated in the form of lump-sum payments to the individuals 
from whom they are collected. 
Initially, we assume that no lump-sum transfers or taxes exist, except those 
necessary to compensate for income taxation, and that Do,  the amount of government debt 
at the beginning of time, is zero.  Thus, z,,  =  0 and v,',,  equals the amount of  income tax 
revenue collected for an age t individual at time s.  These assumptions, which we relax to 
calculate efficiency measures in section 6, imply that debt issues are zero for all s. 
C.  Firms and Technology 
Output in the model is produced by competitive firms that combine capital (K) and 
labor (L) using a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production technology. 
Aggregate capital and labor supplies (in per capita terms) are obtained from individual 
supplies as 
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Note that the capital stock at time s is given by private and public saving decisions at time 
s-1.  Also, recall that we initially assume Ds = 0 for all s. 
The production function is written in terms of the capital-labor ratio K as 
where qs is per capita output and f (.) is defined such that f'  > 0, f"  < 0, lirn ,,_  f'  =  0, 
and lim,,,  f '  = -.  The competitive wage rate and (gross) interest rate are given by 
ws = qs -  V'(9  (8) 
and 
rs = f  '(a)  -  6,  (9) 
where 6 is the depreciation rate on physical capital. 
3.  A Simple Computational Method for Solving the Discrete Tax Problem 
We are fundamentally interested in the following question:  What are the welfare 
and efficiency implications of shifting from a linear tax code to one that can be represented 
by a step function?  Our algorithm for solving the linear case is similar to that described in 
detail in AK (chapter 4), but a brief description here will help to motivate our discussion 
of  the discrete case.  For simplicity, we will focus our attention on the steady states. 
Although computationally more complex, the technique for obtaining solutions for the 
transition path from one steady state to another is analogous. 
A. Solution Procedure  for the Linear Tax Code 
Given the tax code of equation (3), the following steps are employed to obtain 
steady-state solutions: 
(i)  Conjecture values for K  and L (and hence for r and w). 
(ii)  Conjecture a sequence of marginal tax rates, z,,  for t = 1 through 55. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm(iii) Let u,,,, i=c,l  denote the age t marginal utility of consumption and leisure, 
respectively, and let R,  denote the LaGrange multiplier associated with the time t budget 
constraint in equation (2).  Given the conjectured net prices, use equation (2) and the first- 
order conditions 
u,,, -  4 = 0,  (10) 
u,,, -  R, E,W (1 -  z, ) = 0,  and  (1 1) 
-4-,  +R,[l+r(l-  z,)] = 0  (12) 
to solve for the optimal consumption and leisure plans for individual members of each 
generation. 
(iv)  Apply the implied path of wage and asset income to the tax code and update 
the path for marginal tax rates.3 
(v) Repeat steps (iii) and (iv) until the optimal paths of consumption and leisure are 
consistent with the marginal tax rates they imply.4 
(vi)  Aggregate individual labor and asset supplies to obtain updates for K and L. 
(vii) Repeat steps (ii) through (vi) until aggregate labor and asset supplies are 
consistent with individual consumption and leisure decisions. 
Because the utility function given in equation (1) is concave and the budget 
constraints in equation (2) are convex, the arguments in Stokey and Lucas (1989, chapter 
4) will guarantee that these procedures determine the optimal consumption and leisure 
plans given r, w, and the linear tax code. 
Updates are obtained using the Gauss-Seidel method. 
For some ages, individuals may be at a kink where taxable income equals zero.  This is the case when 
an individual who faces a marginal tax rate of zero has taxable income greater than zero and would be in 
the 15 percent marginal tax bracket.  However, if the individual faced a marginal tax rate of  15 percent, 
the household would have taxable income less than zero.  In this situation, the above procedure does not 
work, necessitating the solution procedure we develop for the discrete tax code. 
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Now, consider the  two-bracket, discrete tax code given by equation (3).  The 
application of steps (ii) through (v) in this case is complicated by the need to ensure that 
L  y,* I  j when z, = z  and y:  > j when  z, = zH.  In general, a straightforward application 
of the algorithm described for the linear case need not converge, because the procedure 
does not rule out consumption and leisure paths that imply, for some ages, that yt* > j 
when zt = zL  and  yt* <j  when z, = zH.  That is, when faced with a 15 percent tax rate, 
the individual will work hard enough to be in the 28 percent marginal tax bracket. 
However, a person facing a marginal tax rate of 28 percent would work only hard enough 
to be in the 15 percent tax bracket.  Such paths, of course, are not feasible. 
More formally, the discrete tax case differs from the linear case due to the necessary 
addition of the constraints 
(z, -zH)(y:  -j)  2  0.  (13) 
If  y:  < j,  SO that  z, =  zL,  or y:  > 9,  SO that z, =  zH,  then the constraint in equation (13) 
is not binding at time t. Thus, the first-order conditions (10)-(12) remain valid when 
y:  + j. When yt* =  j,  equations (1 1) and (12) become 
and 
-A_,  +~t/3[l+r(l-z,)]-r/3pt(zL-~H)=  0, 
where p, is the LaGrange multiplier associated with the constraint in equation (13). 
Fortunately, the algorithm described for the linear tax code can be simply amended 
to incorporate the changes implied by equations (1 1')  and (12').  It is straightforward to 
verify that there is some tax rate given by 
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suggests a simple modification of the algorithm described above in steps (ii) through (v): 
First, replace the discrete structure in equation (3) with a hypothetical structure that 
allows a continuum of marginal tax rates between zL  and zH  . Second, replace step (v) 
above with 
(vf  ) Repeat steps (iii) and (iv) until, for each t, (a) z, = zL  and yt*  <  y'  , (b) 
zt =zH  andy:  >y' ,or  (c)  zt = ft  andyt*  =y'. 
It remains only to verify that the sequence of consumption and leisure choices obtained 
from this procedure does in fact maximize utility. Because the utility function is concave 
and the budget set is convex, to prove sufficiency we must prove that the implied value 
function is continuously differentiable. We sketch the general proof in appendix 1. 
To illustrate the nature of the individual choice problem under the discrete code, we 
devise a simple two-period model with given net-of-tax prices and preferences defined by 
U(c, I) = (lnc, +  lnc, )  +  (lnl, +  lnl, ).  (1  5) 
We also assume zL  = 0.15  and zH  =  0.28, first-  and second-period effective wages equal 
to 25 and 27, a real interest rate equal to 0.03, and 7 = 10. In figure 2, we plot the values 
of 5,  implied by the optimal choices of consumption and leisure given various 
(exogenous) values of initial assets a,.  For this example, high values of a, result in 
consumption and leisure choices such that z, = z,  = zL  and first- and second-period 
income is less than J.  Conversely, very low values of a, are associated with choices that 
yield income greater than y' in both periods, and hence z, = z,  = z H. 
For a wide range of initial asset values, equilibrium outcomes for the consumer are 
such that utility is maximized at kinks in the budget surface.  In these cases, individuals 
make consumption and leisure choices as if they face the effective tax rate 
- 
L  ~,(7~-7~)  %,=z +  > zL.  For example, a person born with initial assets of approximately 
A2 
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15 percent.  A 20 percent statutory rate would, by construction, induce the individual to 
choose his taxable income to equal j. 
It is this wedge between the marginal tax rate applied by the fiscal authority and the 
effective rate on which private decisions are made that suggests a potential inefficiency in 
the discrete tax code that does not exist in the linear case:  For individuals at tax-induced 
kinks in their budget constraints, distortions arise from the effective rate f, ,  while 
revenues are based on the lower rate zL.  In the example depicted by figure 2, the 
discrepancy between zi  and zL  rises rapidly as the level of initial assets falls (and hence 
the endogenous level of income rises). 
Further insight is obtained by defining the transformed multiplier p: = p,  (zH  -  zL), 
which has the usual interpretation as the utility price of constraining income to  i, . Thus, 
by rearranging equation (14), we see that f,  = zH  when h,  (zH -  zL)  = p:; that is, when 
the utility loss (in terms of consumption) from being in the higher tax bracket just equals 
the utility loss from constraining income to 3. 
4.  Model Calibration 
A.  Technology 
The simulation exercises reported in section 5 assume an aggregate production 
technology given by 
4, = Ak,B,  (16) 
where 8 is capital's share in production and A is an arbitrary scale factor.  Our benchmark 
value for 8 is 0.36, following Kydland and Prescott (1982).  The value of A is chosen to 
scale steady-state cohort  incomes to values consistent with average household income in 
1989, the year for which the tax code is calibrated. We discuss this choice in more detail 
below. 
In the benchmark model, we assume that the depreciation rate of physical capital is 
10  percent per period, a choice that, again, is motivated by the arguments in Kydland and 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmPrescott.  The population growth rate is set to the postwar U.S. average of 1.3 percent 
per year, and the life-cycle labor efficiency profile {E  t 1''  t=~  is calculated by interpolating 
estimates in Hansen (1986). A description of this profile is given in appendix 2. 
B. Preferences 
We assume that preferences are isoelastic, specializing equation (1)  to 
where the preference parameters o,,  01,  and a  represent the intertemporal elasticities of 
substitution in consumption and leisure and the utility weight of leisure, respectively. In 
our benchmark model, we assume o,  = 1, so that equation (17) becomes 
This form has the special property, not generally exhibited by specification (17), that the 
capital-labor ratio is invariant to the scale factor A in equation (16).5  Also, evidence from 
state-level data reported by Beaudry and van Wincoop (1992) suggests preferences that 
are logarithmic in consumption.6 
MaCurdy's (198 1) study of men's labor supply suggests o, values in the range of 
0.1 to 0.45,  a result that is largely confirmed in related studies (see Pencavel[1986]). 
However, Rogerson and Rupert (1991) argue that, because of comer conditions, 
estimates of the degree of intertemporal substitution obtained from conventional analyses 
Scale invariance follows from the fact that changes in the level of  wages have offsetting wealth and 
substitution effects on individual labor supply decisions.  This property is also used to justify incorporating 
preferences similar in form to equation (17') in real business-cycle models with exogenous rates of labor- 
augmenting technical progress (see King, Plosser, and Rebelo [1988]). 
Beaudry and  van Wincoop also claim (foomote 10) that they found no evidence supporting either non- 
separabilities  between consumption and leisure or the absence of  time-separability in consumption, results 
that generally support the specification in equation (17).  However, their maintained model does include 
"rule-of-thumb" consumers, or individuals who do not behave according to the pure life-cycleJpermanent- 
income hypothesis that we assume. 
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estimates obtained from studies of female labor supply, there is broad agreement that the 
elasticity is higher for women (see Killingsworth and Heckrnan [1986]).  Based on this 
evidence, in our benchmark model we set o,  = 0.25 and choose the parameter a so that 
steady-state hours worked by an individual at peak productivity is slightly greater than 
one-third of total time endowment, which we take to be 16 hours per day. 
Most empirical studies find values for the subjective discount factor P in the 
neighborhood of  1.0, sometimes slightly lower (Hansen and Singleton [1982]), sometimes 
slightly higher (Eichenbaum and Hansen [1990]). We choose a benchmark value of  0.99. 
Together with the other parameter choices, this value results in a steady-state real pre-tax 
interest rate of  about 3.7 percent (which corresponds closely to the [apparent] historical 
average of real pre-tax returns on long-maturity riskless bonds in the United States7) and a 
steady-state capital output ratio of  2.63 (which corresponds closely to the ratio of total 
capital to GDP in the United States over the 1959-1990 period8). 
C.  The Tax Code 
The benchmark tax code is patterned after the statutory U.S. personal tax code for 
1989. Over the income region that is relevant in our simulations, the 1989 schedule was 
given by 
We refer to this tax code as the "tax-reform" case. 
The income levels obtained from the model are matched to the tax code as follows: 
First, we define yH  as the highest income level obtained from an initial calibration 
See Siege1 (1992), which reports average rates for the 1800-1990 period.  We note, for the record, that 
average real rates appear to differ significantly across particular subperiods.  Specifically,  real returns to 
long-term bonds averaged 1.46 percent over the period 1889-1978, but 5.76 percent outside that interval. 
The measure used to construct the U.S. capital stock is the constant-cost net stock of fixed reproducible 
tangible wealth reported in the January  1992 Survey of  Current Business.  This measure includes 
consumer durables and government capital. 
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45-54 in 1988, which we calculate to be $44,217 in 1989 dollars.9  In all subsequent 
simulations, income levels obtained from the model are converted by taking their ratio 
relative to yH  and multiplying by $44,217.  To obtain taxable income, we then subtract 
exemptions and deductions of  $1 1,206.1°  Given that the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution for consumption is assumed to be unity, this is equivalent to scaling the model 
so that gross income matches the data, and then normalizing by 
$44,217  A=  -. 
Y" 
5.  The Welfare Effects of Shifting from a Linear to a Discrete Tax Code 
In this section, we examine the effects of shifting to the tax-reform code from the 
linear code under the maintained assumption of revenue neutrality.  Holding the structure 
of the discrete code constant, two natural approaches to achieving this are 1) choosing the 
intercept of the linear code to equalize revenues, and 2) adjusting deductions to equalize 
revenues.  We focus on the intercept-adjusted approach, a choice motivated by the fact 
that equalizing revenues in this way yields similar degrees of average-tax progressivity in 
both the linear-tax and tax-reform steady states. 
Thus, we parameterize the function ~(y)  in equation (3) as 
The data used in constructing this variable were taken from Current Population Reports, series P-60, 
No.  166. The cohort mean is obtained by multiplying the median income of families with household 
heads aged 45-54 by the ratio of average to median family income for the entire population.  All money 
values in this paper are quoted in 1989 dollars. 
lo This total is obtained by adding personal exemptions of $5260 to deductions of $5946.  The exemption 
total is obtained by multiplying the per person exemption of $2000 specified in the 1989 tax code by  2.63, 
the average household size in 1989. The deduction level is calculated as a weighted average of  the 
standard deduction and the average level of itemized deductions for taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes 
between $0 and $50,000.  Preliminary data from 1989 tax returns, reported in the Spring 1991 issue of the 
Statistics of Income Bulletin, indicate that 19 percent of all returns in the relevant income range included 
itemized deductions, with an average value of  about $9124.  The standard deduction in 1989 was $5200. 
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by the linear code is within 0.001 percent of  the present value of revenues generated by 
the tax-reform transition path and steady state.ll  Throughout this section we will focus on 
simulations conducted with the benchmark parameterization. 
It is useful to first examine the incidence of the income tax in the linear-tax and tax- 
reform steady states. Figure 3 shows marginal tax rates faced by age cohorts in each tax 
regime.  In  the tax-reform case, we plot both the statutory marginal rates and the 
"effective" tax rate, T',  that determine the choices of cohorts at kinks in their budget 
constraints. 
Approximately 35 percent of  the population, accounting for 47 percent of steady- 
state income, face lower marginal tax rates under the linear system.12 The rate reductions 
are concentrated -- and especially pronounced -- at high income levels. The highest 
marginal tax rate in the linear case is just over 22 percent, as opposed 28 percent in the 
tax-reform regime. 
Table 2 provides information on average tax-rate progressivity.  Although no more 
than an informal summary of  the nature of a particular tax code, this measure does 
provide a sense of how average tax liabilities are related to income, highlighting the sort of 
comparisons often invoked in discussions of alternative tax regimes.  Thus, as claimed 
above, the results in table 2 do suggest that in the long run, the linear and tax-reform 
codes we are considering exhibit similar degrees of progressivity, subject to the usual 
caveats about the validity of the average tax measure. 
Equation (19) was obtained by fitting a regression line to the 1965 statutory tax code.  The regression 
equation is estimated over the income range $0 - $54,000, which covers the incomes generated by the 
model. Present values are calculated at the interest rates realized under tax reform, that is, along the 
transition path and in the new steady state.  Measuring revenue neutrality under a fixed assumption about 
interest rates, while not strictly consistent with ex post neutrality, seems consistent with the fashion in 
which tax legislation is actually contemplated.  We choose to use transition-path and final steady-state 
interest rates, as opposed to initial steady-state interest rates, because the final, tax-reform steady state is 
the same in all our simulations. 
l2 These percentages are higher yet if we include individuals at kinks, who behave as if they face higher- 
than-statutory rates. 
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of  shifting from the linear-tax regime to the tax-reform regime.  Figure 4 illustrates 
calculations, obtained from the benchmark model and two alternative preference 
specifications (specifically, two alternative choices for the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in leisure), of welfare gains arising from an unanticipated change in tax 
regime.  Welfare gains are calculated as the percentage increase in full wealth that must be 
taken away from an individual in the tax-reform regime in order to generate the same 
utility he would have enjoyed if the linear code had stayed in effect. Negative numbers 
therefore represent welfare losses. 
Cohorts are identified in figure 4 by year of death.  Thus, the welfare number for 
period 1 of the transition path represents the gain by  an individual age 55 at the time the 
tax-reform regime becomes effective.  All cohorts alive in the initial (linear-tax) steady 
state have died by period 55 of  the transition path. 
In the long run, tax reform generates welfare losses, with the magnitude of  the loss 
positively related to the willingness of individuals to shift leisure intertemporally.  The 
intuition for this relationship between welfare costs and o,  can be appreciated by recalling 
that, because heterogeneity in the steady state is due strictly to life-cycle characteristics, 
the highest incomes in the model are earned by individuals who are at their peak levels of 
labor productivity. As shown in figure 3, this is exactly the period of  the life cycle for 
which tax reform implies higher marginal tax rates relative to the linear regime.  The 
distortions on labor supply created by this fact are magnified for higher degrees of 
willingness to substitute leisure across periods of life.  Thus, an important factor in the 
relative efficiency of  the linear versus discrete tax structure is that for roughly the same 
degree of progressivity, the marginal tax rate faced by the highest-income individuals need 
not be as high in the linear case as in the tax-reform case. 
The welfare effects apparent in figure 4 arise primarily from the direct distortions of 
the tax-reform code vis-8-vis the hypothesized initial linear code, not from general 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmequilibrium effects associated with changes in interest rates and wages.13 In figure 5, we 
compare the welfare effects for the benchmark model with the effects obtained when the 
entire path of interest rates and wages is held fixed at the initial steady-state values. 
Although general equilibrium effects mitigate the welfare losses somewhat, the picture that 
emerges is little changed by the partial equilibrium assumption, especially in the long run. 
Furthermore, losses to cohorts alive at the time of the change in tax structure are 
not due to the unanticipated nature of the regime change.  In figure 6, we plot welfare 
gains along the transition path for the polar case of a change in the tax code that is 
completely anticipated.  In particular, we assume that the tax code changes at year 55 of 
the transition path, so that all individuals know the code that will prevail over their life 
cycle with perfect certainty. For comparability, we designate year 1 as the first period of 
the tax-regime change for both the anticipated and unanticipated cases.  As figure 6 clearly 
demonstrates, the pattern of welfare gains is essentially the same in each. 
Finally, we consider the previously discussed deduction-based method for 
equalizing the present value of revenues in the two tax regimes.  Specifically, we set the 
intercept y in equation (19) equal to 0.146 and iterate over deductions in the initial steady 
state until, as before, the present value of income tax revenues generated by the linear 
code is the same as the present value of revenues generated by  the tax-reform code.14 For 
the benchmark model, this procedure yields deductions of $14,642 in the initial steady 
state.  In this sense, the shift to the tax-reform code, which assumes a deduction level of 
$11,260, also involves a form of base-broadening. 
The welfare calculations for these experiments are shown in figure 7 for the same 
parameter choices used to construct figure 4.  The long-run welfare losses of tax reform 
l3 Recall that for the simulations in this section, we assume that lump-sum taxes and transfers maintain 
zero net tax payments for every cohort at every point in time.  Therefore, wealth effects arise only as a 
result of changes in the aggregate levels of capital and labor, which are in turn reflected in interest rates 
and wages. 
l4 The choice of y = 0.146 is motivated by  the same regressions used to determine the slope of the linear 
code. See footnote 1 1. 
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code than in the intercept-adjusted experiments. However, as reported in table 2, 
equalizing revenues by deduction adjustments results in greater average-tax progressivity 
than does the intercept-adjusted linear code or the tax-reform code.15  Essentially, the 
increase in marginal rates on high-productivityhigh-asset cohorts associated with tax 
reform is smaller when taxes are equalized by increasing deductions in the linear code, 
resulting in the smaller long-run welfare losses. 
This last observation underscores a critical point that bears reemphasizing. The 
relative welfare effects of each of the tax structures we consider are dependent on the 
relative levels of  marginal tax rates necessary to preserve revenue neutrality.  The discrete 
code examined here generates welfare losses because a linear code with similar average- 
tax progressivity (or less progressivity, for that matter) allows the application of  lower 
rates to the critical high-income cohorts. 
6.  The Efficiency Effects of Shifting from a Linear to a Discrete Tax Code 
The pattern of welfare effects in figures 4-7 clearly indicates that the shift from our 
hypothesized linear-tax regimes to the tax-reform regime is not Pareto-improving. 
However, the welfare calculations presented do not provide a simple measure that 
summarizes the economic cost of  the change.  Furthermore, as shown in figure 8, there 
are long-run welfare gains  for some plausible alternatives to the benchmark model.  For 
these cases, the question is open as to whether there exists a set of transfers that preserves 
some of these long-run gains, while eliminating all welfare losses of cohorts alive along the 
transition path.  In other words, is the shift to the tax-reform regime Pareto-improving for 
some plausible alternative parameterizations of the model? 
Note, from table 2, that the marginal tax rate reported for the lowest income cohort is zero.  This 
reflects the fact that, for this cohort, deductions exceed steady-state income. Rather than allow a negative 
tax,  we set the tax rate to zero.  This introduces a kink at zero taxable income in the linear tax-code case. 
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introduced in Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983).  To obtain this measure, we 
assume that the government implements a lump-sum transfer scheme that maintains status 
quo utility levels for all cohorts alive in the initial steady state.  These transfers are 
financed by government borrowing or lending, which is ultimately paid for by lump-sum 
taxes on, or subsidies to, future generations.  The efficiency gain is measured as the 
constant wealth-equivalent amount of utility that each of these generations realizes when 
the general equilibrium effects of the government transfer scheme are implemented in the 
economy. l6 
To this end, we note that when the government sector is extended in this fashion, 
the per capita level of  debt evolves according to the relationship 
where 
and 
The transfer v,,  in equation (21) (a transfer to an age t individual at time s) differs from 
v;,  in equation (2) by an amount equal to the distribution of lump-sum transfers that 
compensate for revenues raised from the income tax.  Letting s=l be the first period of the 
transition path and normalizing the population at s=l  to unity, intertemporal budget 
balance for the government requires that 
The algorithm for obtaining our efficiency measure proceeds in the following steps. 
l6 Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner refer to the hypothetical government agency that implements these 
policies as the "Lump Sum Redistribution Authority." 
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reform) steady state. 
(ii)  Calculate the present value of  lump-sum taxes, net of lump-sum transfers, that 
would be needed to maintain all cohorts at the initial steady-state level of utility.  Refer to 
the resulting number as the "utility-compensation surplus," or UCS.  If positive, the UCS 
determines the present value of  transfers that can redistributed by the government while 
maintaining long-run budget balance.  Zf negative, the UCS determines the present value of 
taxes that must be raised to maintain budget balance. 
(iii) Maintain the utility level of all cohorts alive at the time of the tax regime 
change, so that the government budget balance is satisfied by solving for the constant tax 
or transfer, as a percentage of each cohort's full wealth, that can be applied to all 
subsequent cohorts while just exhausting the UCS.17 
(iv) Use the path of taxes and transfers from steps (ii) and (iii), along with the 
associated path of government debt implied by equation (20), to recalculate the entire 
problem, as described in section 3. 
(v)  Update interest rates and the UCS until the procedures converge to an 
equilibrium that satisfies public and private budget constraints, all market-clearing 
conditions, and the first-order conditions governing individual consumption and leisure 
choices.  Once the problem has converged, the efficiency gain is the percentage of full 
wealth that is redistributed to (or taken from) all cohorts born after the change in tax 
regime, as calculated in step (iii). 
l7 Full wealth, a,  is defined as the present value of wage income when the entire time endowment is 
allocated to labor. Thus, 
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structure are reported in table 3 for alternative parameterizations of the model.  Losses are 
associated with all the cases considered, even those in which there is a long-run welfare 
gain from shifting to tax reform, as in figure 8.  Thus, the short-run welfare losses that 
occur in figure 8 dominate the long-run welfare gains. 
When revenues are equalized by adjusting the intercept of the linear code in the 
benchmark model, the shift to the tax-reform code results in an efficiency loss of 0.23 
percent of full wealth.  More generally, calculated losses range from 0.12 percent to 0.35 
percent, depending on the chosen parameters.  When revenues are equalized by adjusting 
deductions, the efficiency losses are uniformly smaller, but still range from 0.05 percent to 
0.17 percent of full wealth. As shown, losses increase with individuals' willingness to shift 
resources intertemporally, again reflecting the fact that high-tax periods correspond to 
periods of high relative saving rates and high labor productivity. 
Again, the efficiency losses represent the percentage increases in full lifetime wealth 
that would be needed to compensate every cohort born after the regime change, given that 
those born before the tax code change have already received lump-sum transfers (taxes) 
and are thus indifferent between the two regimes. As a point of comparison with similar 
exercises, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, chapter 5) report efficiency losses associated 
with switching from a 15  percent income tax to an equal-revenue wage tax that fall in a 
range from approximately zero to 0.7 percent.18 To put some perspective on these 
magnitudes, the full wealth of each cohort in the tax-reform steady state is about 63 
percent of total output.  Thus, a reduction in full wealth of 0.23 percent represents an 
annual loss equal to about 0.14 percent of output in the model.  Converting full wealth in 
l8 Auerbach and Kotlikoffs calculations use the initial, rather than fd,  steady state as the basis for 
comparison. Furthermore, ow  numbers are not strictly comparable to theirs due to differences in 
parameterization. However, we feel these differences are small enough to make comparisons of the results 
informative. 
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person born (or reaching working age) after the regime change. 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
Significant reductions in the number of marginal tax-rate brackets -- that is, a trend 
toward structuring systems of personal income taxation such that there exists wide bands 
of income over which marginal tax rates are flat -- has been a striking characteristic of 
worldwide tax reform over the past decade.  In this paper, we have argued that this trend 
cannot be easily accounted for by appealing to the efficiency gains inherent in tax codes 
with just a few brackets separated by discrete rate jumps.  Relative to revenue-neutral 
linear tax codes, changing to a simple two-bracket discrete rate structure creates efficiency 
losses in all the numerical experiments we conduct. Furthermore, in most cases welfare 
gains are negative, even in the long run. 
Two explanations come immediately to mind for the discrepancy between the reality 
of recent tax reforms and the message of our analysis. First, our analysis is conducted in a 
purely life-cycle framework. Hence, in steady-state equilibria, all cohorts face exactly the 
same life-cycle profile of  relatively high taxes during periods of peak productivity and 
saving.  The inefficiency of the discrete code we consider follows in important ways from 
the fact that, holding average-tax progressivity constant, shifting from an equal-revenue 
linear code requires marginal tax-rate increases during this phase of the life cycle.  This 
result is in turn related to distortions in leisure and consumption decisions at kinks in each 
cohort's budget constraint that do not increase income tax revenues to the government. 
These effects would likely be mitigated in a more general framework that included 
intracohort heterogeneity.  For instance, suppose that there existed two types of agents, 
"rich folks" and "poor folks."  It is conceivable that the two-bracket tax code could be 
structured so that the shift from the linear tax would result in poor folks facing only the 
lower rate and rich folks facing only the higher rate over their entire lives.  In this event, 
the discrete tax code would be equivalent to a flat-tax regime, which would almost 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcertainly create welfare and efficiency gains.  In a slightly less extreme case, some portion 
of each cohort would face the life-cycle pattern of rates on which we have focused, while 
for others, the poor-folklrich-folk scenario would be relevant.  It is an open question, then, 
as to what effects would dominate. 
The second explanation for the widespread adoption of  rate-bracket reductions is 
that, perhaps for administrative or political reasons, they are a necessary concomitant to 
lowering the level of tax rates and the various base-broadening measures that also 
characterized tax reform in the 1980s. In this case, the institutional approach advocated 
by Slernrod (1990) may ultimately be necessary to fully understand the consequences of 
the income tax systems that have undeniably come to dominate industrialized economies. 
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Top Marginal  # of Re-  Top Marginal  # of Post- 
Tax Rate,  Refoxm  Tax Rate,  Refonn 
Country  Re-Reform  Year  Brackets  Post-Reform  Year  Brackets 
Australia  60%  1980-86  5  49%  1987-88-  4 
47%  1992  5 
Austria  62%  1982-88*  lo**  50%  1989  5 
Belgium  72%  1983-88  13**  50%  1989-92  7 
Canada  34%  1987*  10  29%  1988-92 
Japan  70%  1984-86  15  60%  1987 
50%  1988-92 
Netherlands  72%  1982-86*  9  66%  1987-88 
60%  1990-92 
New  66%  1979-85  5  48%  1986 
Zealand  33%  1988-92 
Sweden  80%  1985*  11  72%  1986 
50%  199 1-92*** 
United  83%  1978*  11  60%  1979 
Kingdom  40%  1988-92 
United  50%  1983-85  15  33%  1986 
States  3 1%  1992 
Notes:  *  Rate may have been in effect prior to earliest date indicated. 
**  Figures refer to number of rate brackets in 1988. 
*** From 0 to SEK  186,600, the national tax is a flat SEK 100. For incomes in 
excess of SEK 186,600, the tax is SEK 100 plus  20 percent of the excess. 
Sources:  Platt (1985), Tanzi (1987), Bosh  and McLure (1990), Whalley (1990a,b), 
various issues of the OECD Economic Survey, and the 1992 and 1982 editions 
of Price Waterhouse's Individual Taxes: A Worldwide Summary. 
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the Discrete-Tax-Code Problem 
Our algorithm for solving individual consumption and leisure paths for the tax 
code in equation (13) relies on the validity of replacing the discrete structure with an 
equivalent continuous structure. Because this hypothetical tax code is, by construction, 
identical to the actual tax code when the conditions z, =  zL  and y:  <  7  or 
z,  =  zH and  y:  > j  are satisfied, we need only consider the case when the constraint 
(z, -  zH  )(yf -  jj) 2  0 is binding.  As in the text, we will focus on the steady state, 
recognizing that transition-path solutions are directly analogous under our perfect 
certainty assumption. 
Let 
W(a) = u[c(a),I(a)l+ @'[G(a*)17  (All 
where G(a)  denotes the transition equations defined by the budget constraints in equation 
(2),  a*  is the asset choice that solves 
and a' represents next-period's asset choice. 
Because u(-)  is concave, W(a)  is concave.  Furthermore, W(a) is continuously 
differentiable if  its derivative, Wt(a), exists and is continuous.  If Wt(a) is continuous, 
then  V'(a) is continuous by Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979).  To demonstrate the 
continuity of  Wt(a), we need to consider the points at which  y*  =  j? . That is, we must 
show that Kc  (a*)  = q(a*) (where c indicates the constraint is binding and uc indicates it 
is not) at the indifference points where f  = zL  and f = zH. 
By definition, y' = ~[l-  l(a*)]  +  ra* when the income constraint binds.  Thus, 
differentiating (Al) and substituting from this constraint and the first-order conditions 
gives 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFor simplicity, we assume that the labor-efficiency variable, E, is equal to one. 
Similarly, by exploiting the first-order conditions for the unconstrained case, we 
obtain 
w,',  (a*)  =  u, 
w(1-  2) 
But recall that, by construction, % =  2 + mH  -  "I.  Therefore, because p=O  when the 
h 
income constraint no longer binds, from equations (A3) and  (A4) we have the desired 
result. 
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The efficiency profile in section 4A is calculated by interpolating the estimates in 
the data appendix to Part IU,  "Fluctuations in Total Hours Worked: A Study Using 
Efficiency Units," in Hansen (1986).  The piecewise linear function used in defining this 
profile is given by 
5.8*(0.44+0.034t)  fort=l to5 
5.8*(0.485+0.025t)  for t=6  to  15 
5.8*(0.65+0.014t)  for t = 16 to 25 
5.8 *  (0.975 +  0.00 It)  for t = 26 to 35 
5.8 *  (1.22 -  0.0061)  for t =36 to  45 
5.8 *  (2.345 -  0.03 It)  for t = 46 to 55. 
With this function, E, peaks at t=35, at which point its value is 113 percent higher than the 
lowest value, at t=l. From t=35,  E, declines to the fmal period of  life, t=55.  At t=55, E, 
is approximately 37 percent lower than its peak value. The full efficiency profile is shown 
in figure A2.1. 
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Efficiency  Profile 
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Sources:  Hansen (1986) and authors' calculations. 
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